Statement of Advocates President Cathy Chase on FAST Act Implementation

  • May 21, 2018
150 150 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety









MAY 22, 2018


Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) is a coalition of public health, safety, and consumer organizations, insurers and insurance agents that promotes highway and auto safety through the adoption of federal and state laws, policies and regulations.  Advocates is unique both in its Board of Directors composition and its mission of advancing safer vehicles, safer drivers and safer roads.  Advocates respectfully requests that this statement be included in the hearing record.

Fatalities Caused by Commercial Motor Vehicle Crashes Continue to Climb

Fatal truck crashes continue to occur at an alarmingly high rate.  In 2016, 4,317 people were killed in crashes involving large trucks.[1]  This is an increase of 5.4 percent from the previous year and an increase of 28 percent since 2009.[2]  The number of 2016 fatalities in crashes involving large trucks is also the highest since 2007.[3]  Additionally, 116,000 people were injured in crashes involving large trucks in 2015, the latest year for which injury data is available. This is a 57 percent increase since 2009.[4]  In fatal two-vehicle crashes between a large truck and a passenger motor vehicle, 97 percent of the fatalities were occupants of the passenger vehicle.[5]

Since 1990, when Advocates first started tracking crashes involving motorcoaches, there have been more than 200 crashes and fires resulting in at least 484 deaths and 4,618 injuries including notable and horrific crashes in New Orleans, Louisiana (1999), Atlanta, Georgia (2007), Mexican Hat, Utah (2008), Orland, California (2014) and Palm Springs, California (2016).[6]

The cost to society from crashes involving commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) was estimated to be $118 billion in 2015.[7]  The U.S. taxpayer unfairly subsidizes the cost of infrastructure damage caused by bigger, heavier trucks.  According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), a truck weighing over 80,000 pounds only pays between 40 and 50 percent of its cost responsibility.[8]  The 2007 Transportation for Tomorrow report, mandated by Congress, confirmed that heavy trucks were underpaying their fair share for highway use, that user fee fairness could be achieved through weight-distance taxes, that heavy trucks should pay an infrastructure damage fee, and that the Heavy Vehicle Use Tax—which only contributes one billion dollars annually to the Highway Trust Fund—had not been changed since the early 1980s.[9]


Motor Carrier Provisions in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act

The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) represented a missed opportunity for Congress to enact meaningful legislation to address the troubling safety record of large trucks and motorcoaches.[10]  Instead the legislation included attacks on safety regulations and laws,[11] roadblocks to implementing commonsense regulations,[12] unnecessary studies [13] and the removal of truck carrier safety data from public view.[14]  These measures did not advance safety, but represented a significant step backward.  When the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, as well as the full Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, begins consideration of the next major transportation and infrastructure legislation, Advocates urges you to address the unfinished safety agenda in order to reduce the preventable death and injury toll caused by CMV crashes.


Critical Safety Regulations Under Constant Attack

Despite the rising trend of CMV-related crashes, deaths and injuries, critical federal safety regulations that address driver fatigue, prevent oversized rigs from threatening the safety of all road users and damaging our Nation’s crumbling infrastructure,[15] ensure drivers are properly trained and qualified, and take unsafe carriers off the road are continuously being undermined by corporate trucking vested interests that place profits above public safety.

Electronic Logging Devices

Driver fatigue is a well-known CMV safety problem.  CMV drivers often operate very long shifts without adequate sleep, on constantly changing schedules that conflict with biological circadian rhythms.  In fact, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has repeatedly cited fatigue as a major contributor to truck crashes and included reducing fatigue related crashes on its 2017-18 Most Wanted List of safety changes.[16]  Moreover, self-reports of fatigue, which almost always underestimate the problem, document that fatigue in truck operations is a significant issue.   In a 2006 driver survey prepared for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), “65 percent [of drivers] reported that they often or sometimes felt drowsy while driving” and almost half (47.6 percent) of drivers said they had fallen asleep while driving in the previous year.[17]  Fatigue and sleep deprivation, and the associated dangers of falling asleep at the wheel, inattention and loss of alertness, are responsible for 13 percent or more of heavy truck crashes.[18]

One of the most effective tools to help prevent driver fatigue is the use of Electronic Logging Devices (ELD) to record drivers’ hours-of-service (HOS).  Paper logs are frequently referred to as “comic books” throughout the industry because of the ease in falsifying actual driving and work time.[19]  It is a commonly known practice for a driver to have two sets of log books – one to hand to law enforcement if they are pulled over and one to hand in to the employer to get paid.

Moreover, in 2016, over 480,000 violations involving some form of HOS violation were issued to CMV operators accounting for nearly half of all driver violations.[20]  The benefits of using an ELD are incontrovertible.  The FMCSA estimates that requiring ELDs will save 26 lives, prevent over 500 injuries and avoid over 1,800 crashes annually.[21]  In addition, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) estimates the annualized net benefits of adopting ELDs to be over $1 billion.[22]  Congress, recognizing the benefits of ELDs, mandated their use as part of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21) Act.[23]  In 2015, the FMCSA delivered on this Congressional directive and issued a rule requiring the use of ELDs which went into effect in December of last year with a phased-in compliance period that ends in December of 2019.[24]

This commonsense regulation is supported by a wide ranging and diverse group of stakeholders representing carriers, drivers, law enforcement, consumer, public health and safety organizations as well as truck crash survivors and families of crash victims.  Despite this broad support and established final rule, a vocal minority continues to object to the use of this technology and is filing meritless applications for exemptions from compliance with the federal law with the FMCSA in a concerted effort undermine the regulation.  The common thread among these applications is an attempt to rehash arguments that did not prevail during the comprehensive rulemaking process or that were unsuccessful in overturning the rule in litigation.[25]  Advocates strongly urges Congress to reject any efforts to diminish the ELD rule as it will undoubtedly prevent crashes involving tired CMV drivers and save lives.

Weakening Hours-of-Service Regulations

The operations of certain segments of the trucking industry exacerbate the epidemic of driver fatigue, yet they continue to push for further erosion of HOS safety regulations.  These attempts fly in the face of conclusions by researchers worldwide, the NTSB, the FMCSA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) which all recognize that unsafe freight transportation practices of long duty and driving hours, backward shift rotation, and inadequate sleep  are fatiguing and dangerous.[26]   In fact, the American Academy of Sleep Medicine warns that drowsy driving can have the same consequences as driving while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.[27]  Studies also consistently show that long working hours per day and per week are related to adverse health effects including obesity.[28]  Further, according to a National Academies of Science report, “[a] substantial evidence base supports the fundamental relationship between sleep needs and health risks.”  The report cites studies that these deleterious health consequences include “an increased risk of hypertension, diabetes, obesity, depression, [heart] attack, and stroke.”[29]

Numerous researchers have stressed that long consecutive driving hours, long duty weeks, and inadequate and interrupted sleep are directly related to increased crash risks.  In fact, many researchers, as well as the FMCSA, have shown that the risk of having a crash rapidly increases after the 8th or 9th consecutive hour of driving.[30]  Research conducted for the FMCSA confirms that crash risk increases as time spent driving increases for drivers from at least the 7th through the 11th consecutive hour of driving.[31]  An additional FMCSA study shows that driving towards the end of the 14-hour shift, that is, more than 10 hours after reporting for duty (i.e., during hours 10 through 14 in a driver’s work day) increases crash risk reflected in safety-critical events.[32]

The FMCSA, sometimes with Congressional interference, has promulgated several HOS rules that govern when drivers may operate a CMV that have done little to combat fatigue and reduce egregious working and driving hours for truck drivers.  In 2003, regulatory changes were made to the HOS rules which resulted in a dramatic and significant increase in the daily and weekly driving and working hours of truck drivers, even in the face of compelling research and evidence that excessive work and driving hours cause truck drivers to be fatigued.[33]  In 2011, the FMCSA issued a final HOS rule that was intended to ameliorate some of the safety-negative impacts that the 2003 changes to the HOS rules made.[34]  These improvements were meant to reduce the extreme working hours for CMV drivers while increasing the opportunity for meaningful rest during shifts and between extended tours of duty.[35]  However, in 2014, at the behest of special interests and despite a disturbing upward trend in large truck related deaths and injuries, Congress suspended enforcement of the modest 2011 reforms and these provisions are no longer enforced by the FMCSA.[36]

After undermining recent safety improvements to the HOS rule, segments of the trucking industry continue efforts to further erode safety requirements by trying to take another “bite at the apple” in attacking the ELD rule.  It is critically important to note that use of ELDs in no way alters, amends or changes the existing HOS regulations.  This incontrovertible fact cannot be overstated.  The ELD rule has brought to light what safety advocates have known and have been saying for decades: certain segments of the industry do not follow the HOS regulations (regardless of its content) and are now confronted by the fact that an objective record of actual on-duty hours will finally reveal the inhumane working conditions of many of our Nation’s CMV drivers.

One such attack on HOS safeguards is legislation which would further erode the HOS rules by eliminating the only mandatory federal rest break for CMV drivers and which would extend the period during which a driver may be behind the wheel, a bill now pending before Congress.[37]   At a time when truck crashes continue to rise and accurate enforcement of driver hours can finally be undertaken by law enforcement, HOS regulations must not be further eroded.

Additional Protections to Prevent Driver Fatigue

In 2016, the FMCSA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) requesting information regarding the potential benefits of regulatory action to address the safety risks posed by CMV drivers who are afflicted with obstructive sleep apnea (OSA).[38]  This regulatory action followed a 2012 joint vehement recommendation by FMCSA’s Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee (MCSAC) and Medical Review Board (MRB) that an OSA diagnosis precludes unconditional certification of a driver and that all drivers should be screened and treated for the condition.[39]

Compelling and consistent research has revealed that drivers afflicted with OSA that is not properly treated are more prone to fatigue and have a higher crash rate than the general driver population.  The American Academy of Sleep Medicine (AASM) has found that for individuals with OSA, eight hours of sleep can be less restful or refreshing than four hours of ordinary, uninterrupted sleep.[40]  As noted in the ANPRM “undiagnosed or inadequately treated moderate to severe OSA can cause unintended sleep episodes and resulting deficits in attention, concentration, situational awareness, and memory, thus reducing the capacity to safely respond to hazards when performing safety sensitive duties.”[41]  In fact, a 2016 AASM study concluded that the rate of serious, preventable crashes was five times higher among truck drivers with OSA that was not properly treated.[42]  In contrast, the crash rate of drivers with OSA who received some type of treatment was similar to those drivers without the disorder.[43]  Moreover, a study of Swedish motor vehicle drivers published in 2015 found that drivers with OSA had a 2.5-fold higher crash rate.[44]  The dangers presented by OSA are not confined to the motor carrier industry, yet they are responded to differently.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) considers OSA to be a disqualifying condition unless properly treated.[45]

The ANPRM further notes that individuals inflicted with OSA often are unaware that they have the condition and as a result, the condition is underdiagnosed by medical professionals.[46]  In fact, experts estimate that 300,000 to over 1 million CMV drivers have OSA and most of these drivers are undiagnosed and not receiving treatment.[47]  In sum, research and objective data shows that untreated OSA can lead to dangerous fatigue and a higher crash rate proving that this public safety threat requires concerted regulatory action from the FMCSA.[48]  Yet, in August of 2017 the FMCSA withdrew the OSA rulemaking without providing any credible analysis or reasoning for such an ill-advised course of action.[49]  Advocates supports H.R. 3882 sponsored by Representatives Bill Pascrell, Jr. (NJ-9), Eleanor Holmes Norton (DC), Frank Pallone, Jr. (NJ-6) and Albio Sires (NJ-8) which directs the FMCSA to issue a rule to ensure that drivers afflicted with OSA are properly screened during the medical examination and are receiving the medical treatment they need so they do not become needlessly fatigued while operating a CMV on public roads.[50]

State Law Preemption

Lastly, some corporate trucking interests continue to try to attach a dangerous provision that would preempt state health, safety and labor laws which provide much needed meal and rest breaks to CMV drivers to various bills being debated by Congress.  This occurred most recently in legislation to fund the U.S. DOT and its agencies as well as to a separate bill to reauthorize the FAA.[51]  Twenty states have such statutes that provide flexibility to an employer as to when these breaks occur which are often a thirty minute meal period or a ten minute rest break.[52]  Although such a provision would affect nearly half the states in the U.S., it has yet to be subject to any public hearings in Congress or meaningful debate of its merits or wide-sweeping implications.  Advocates opposes efforts to repeal these critical rest protections for drivers because doing so would substantially debase public safety.

Teen Truck Drivers

Congress is currently considering several bills that would allow teenagers to operate CMVs in interstate commerce, although data and research clearly demonstrate these younger drivers are not qualified to drive large trucks.[53]  In order to obtain a commercial driver’s license (CDL) to drive a CMV in interstate commerce, an applicant must be at least 21 years-of-age and for good reason.[54]  Younger CMV drivers have higher crash rates.  In fact, CMV drivers under the age of 19 are four times more likely to be involved in fatal crashes, as compared to CMV drivers who are 21 years of age and older, and CMV drivers ages 19-20 are six times more likely to be involved in fatal crashes (compared to CMV drivers 21 years and older).[55]  Furthermore, CMV drivers aged 19-20 are about five times more likely to be involved in police reported injury and fatality crashes per 100 million vehicle miles traveled compared to all other truck drivers age 21 and older.[56]   The FMCSA previously declined to lower the minimum age for an unrestricted CDL to 18 as part of a pilot program because the Agency could not conclude that the “safety performance of these younger drivers is sufficiently close to that of older drivers of CMVs[.]”[57]  The public overwhelmingly rejected the idea with 96 percent of individuals who filed comments to the federal docket opposing the proposal along with 88 percent of the truck drivers and 86 percent of the motor carriers.[58]  Therefore, the pilot program mandated in the FAST Act for veterans of the armed services should not be expanded and further attempts to allow teenagers to operate CMVs in interstate commerce should be summarily rejected by Congress.[59]

Eroding Federal Truck Size and Weight Limits

Federal limits on the weight and size of CMVs are intended to protect both the traveling public and our Nation’s crumbling infrastructure.  Yet, provisions allowing larger and heavier trucks that violate or circumvent these federal laws to operate in certain states or for specific industries have been consistently tucked into must-pass transportation appropriations bills to avoid public scrutiny.[60]  These back room deals not only harm public safety but they impose a hidden tax on all Americans while padding corporate special interest profits.

Increases to current truck size and weight limits pose a grave danger to the public because data reveals that even the current fleet is not properly maintained.  Tractor-trailers moving at 60 mph are required to stop in 310 feet – the length of a football field – once the brakes are applied.[61]  Actual stopping distances are often much longer due to driver response time before braking and the common problem that truck brakes are often not in top working condition.  In 2016, violations related to tires and/or brakes accounted for ten of the top twenty most common vehicle out-of-service (OOS) violations.[62]  In fact, more than one in every five trucks that is inspected is placed out of service for vehicle deficiencies including inadequate brakes that prevent it from continuing to operate.[63]

Overweight trucks also disproportionately damage our badly deteriorated roads and bridges.  An 18,000 pound truck axle does over 3,000 times more damage to pavement than a typical passenger vehicle axle.[64]  Moreover, increasing the weight of a heavy truck by only ten percent increases bridge damage by 33 percent.  This is especially alarming given that one in eleven of the Nation’s nearly 615,000 bridges in the National Bridge Inventory were found to be structurally deficient.[65]   The Nation’s roads continue to receive a grade of “D” from the American Society of Civil Engineers which noted that 20 percent of the nation’s highways alone had poor pavement conditions in 2014.  This does not include those highways with mediocre conditions and all other non-highway roads.[66]

A few trucking and shipping interests have also relentlessly advocated for a federal mandate requiring the use of 33 feet double trailers, or “double 33s,” a truck tractor pulling two 33-foot trailers.  This truck configuration would result in a truck-trailer-trailer combination length of at least 84 feet – the height of an 8-story building.  This increase the in the size of already monstrous trucks on our highways is opposed by a widespread coalition of motor carriers, truck drivers, law enforcement, first responders, rail interests, safety advocates, truck crash survivors and families of truck crash victims.  A federal mandate for double 33 foot trailer trucks will also preempt state laws in states that do not want double 33s, overriding state legislative decisions to protect public safety.  Right now, the federal minimum permits 28 foot trailers and allows states to permit double 33s if they choose to do so, but most states are choosing not to.  A federal law requiring double 33s would put insurmountable pressure on states to allow these overly long trucks on their roads at the expense of safety and state infrastructure spending.  States are wise to prohibit the use of double 33s because of their impact on roadway infrastructure and their troubling safety record.  Double trailer trucks have an 11 percent higher fatal crash rate than single trailer trucks.[67]   Moreover, the U.S. DOT Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Study found that mandating double 33s nationwide is projected to result in 2,478 additional bridges that would require strengthening or replacement resulting in an estimated one-time cost of $1.1 billion.[68]

The DOT has also recommended against altering current federal weight and size limits.  Technical reports released in June 2015 from the DOT Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Study concluded there is a “profound” lack of data from which to quantify the safety impact of larger or heavier trucks and consequently recommended that no changes in the relevant truck size and weight laws and regulations be considered until data limitations are overcome.[69]


  • In order to properly address CMV driver fatigue, Congress must reject efforts to diminish the ELD final rule, weaken HOS regulations and preempt state rest break laws. The FMCSA must issue a regulation to ensure drivers with OSA are properly treated so they are not a threat to public safety while operating a CMV.
  • Teen truck drivers have far higher crash rates than older CMV drivers. Therefore, Congress should not lower the age to obtain a CDL to operate in interstate commerce or endorse efforts to expand the pilot program for members of the armed services established in the FAST Act.
  • Congress must oppose any and all changes to federal truck size and weight limits, including mandating double 33 feet trailers, pilot programs and state or industry specific exemptions. Allowing even more massive CMVs on our Nation’s roads will not only harm public safety but will also further erode America’s crumbling infrastructure.


Advocates Has Consistently Promoted Placing Advanced Technologies in Commercial Motor Vehicles to Save Lives and Prevent Injuries

Advocates has always enthusiastically championed safety technology for CMVs and for good reason.  It is one of the most effective strategies for preventing deaths and injuries.  During the Congressional debate of MAP-21, Advocates fought for a provision that required the U.S. DOT Secretary to consider placing stability enhancing technology in all motorcoaches.[70]  In 2015, the NHTSA issued a final rule requiring electronic stability control (ESC) on most large trucks and motorcoaches, which Advocates supported after working for years to urge Agency action on this issue and filing technical comments to the NPRM issued by the NHTSA in 2012.[71]  Advocates continues to push for the placement of proven safety technologies is all CMVs.

Automatic Emergency Braking

In 2015, Advocates, along with the Center for Auto Safety, the Truck Safety Coalition (TSC) and Road Safe America, filed a petition with the NHTSA seeking the issuance of a rule to require forward collision avoidance and mitigation braking systems (F-CAM), also known as automatic emergency braking (AEB), on CMVs with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or more.[72]  These systems alert the driver to an object in front of the CMV such as a motor vehicle and can apply the brakes to stop the CMV if the driver fails to respond. According to the NHTSA, from 2003 through 2008, large trucks were the striking vehicle in approximately 32,000 rear-end crashes resulting in 300 fatalities and injuring over 15,000 people annually.[73]  The Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) indicates that in 2016 more than 1,700 large trucks were involved in fatal crashes where the front end of a large truck is the initial point of impact.[74]  In addition, the Agency estimates that fleet wide adoption of advanced AEB systems could save 166 lives per year, a reduction of 45 percent from current annual fatalities resulting from rear-end crashes.  The number of injured persons would fall by 8,361 per year, a reduction of 45 percent.[75]  The Agency granted Advocates’ petition in October of 2015 but has not undertaken any further regulatory proceedings to date.[76]  This needless delay is unconscionable when crashes could be prevented and lives could be saved by technology that is available and already in a number of CMVs.

Speed Limiting Technology

In September of 2016, the NHTSA and the FMCSA issued a joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to require vehicles with a GVWR of more than 26,000 pounds to be equipped with a speed limiting device.[77]  Advocates supports the use of speed limiting devices because crashes involving heavy vehicles are far more deadly when the CMV is traveling at faster speeds.  According to the FMCSA, 10,440 people were killed from 2004 to 2013 in crashes where the speed of the CMV likely contributed to the severity of the crash.  On average, that is over 1,000 lives lost annually to speeding CMVs.[78]

The safety benefits of limiting the speed of a CMV are indisputable.  The NPRM estimates that setting the device at 60 MPH has the potential to save almost 500 lives and prevent nearly 11,000 injuries annually.[79]  Along with setting the speed at 60 MPH, all CMVs must be required to be equipped with speed limiting technology in order for the proposed regulation to realize the maximum feasible safety benefits as quickly as possible.  The cost of the proposed requirement is expected to be minimal since most CMVs are already equipped with either mechanical or electronic capability to limit the speed of the vehicle.  Turning on the speed limiters that are not already engaged, or changing the speed control to the limit required by the final rule, involves only a minor maintenance cost.

Speed limiters are also already widely used in the industry and their implementation is supported by truck drivers.  Research shows that the technology is currently being used by 77 percent of trucks on the road in the United States.[80]  In addition, a 2007 survey of truck drivers by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) found 64 percent of drivers were in favor of a truck speed governor requirement.[81]

Although the public safety benefits of requiring speed limiting devices in CMVs is clear and a majority of the current fleet is already equipped with the technology, DOT continues to delay the issuance of a final rule to require this life-saving safety equipment.

Underride Guards

Underride crashes, where a motor vehicle travels underneath the rear or side of a truck trailer, are particularly gruesome and deadly.  However, technology is currently available that can significantly increase the chances that an individual can survive these violent events.  For this reason, Advocates supports enactment of the Stop Underrides Act of 2017 (H.R. 4622) sponsored by Representatives Steve Cohen (TN-9), Mark DeSaulnier (CA-11), Richard Nolan (MN-8), David Price (NC-4) and Alan S. Lowenthal (CA-47).[82]  This important legislation will require the current federal standards for rear underride guards to be upgraded to meet current industry standards as well as the installation of side and front guards.

In 2015, the NHTSA issued a NPRM to update the standards for rear impact guards that are installed on the rear of trailers.  However, the NPRM proposed only to upgrade the federal standard issued 20 years ago,[83] to meet the Canadian standard issued over a decade ago, rather than adopting higher, more stringent standards which are currently available in the marketplace and have been shown to have superior performance capabilities and the potential to significantly reduce occupant deaths and injuries in underride crashes.[84]  In addition, the Agency failed to require that single-unit trucks (SUTs) be equipped with underride guards, instead requiring retroreflective tape on the side and rear of SUTs.[85]  While requiring retroreflective tape is long overdue, it alone is not a sufficient countermeasure.  While retroreflective tape may help prevent some collisions with SUTs, it will not prevent all such collisions and it is the rear underride guard which will prevent or mitigate fatalities and injuries when collisions nevertheless occur.  Therefore, in order to properly address the public safety threat posed by rear underride crashes, the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) that apply to rear underride guards should be updated to meet the optimal standards already in use by industry and should be applied to SUTs as well as trailers.

Side underride crashes where a motor vehicle travels underneath the side of a trailer or a SUT also pose a serious threat to public safety.  In May of 2017, IIHS conducted its first testing of side underride guards that successfully prevented a passenger vehicle from traveling underneath the side of a trailer.[86]  These guards have now been proven to be able to save lives and mitigate crashes and thus, should be required as standard equipment on all trailers and SUTs.  In addition, front guards that prevent a truck from overriding or traveling over a passenger motor vehicle when the truck strikes the rear of the vehicle have been in use in the European Union for years.[87]  Moreover, the NTSB has recommended that both side and front underride guards be placed on CMVs.[88]  It is time for this lifesaving equipment to finally make its way onto American roads.


  • Technologies that prevent and mitigate crashes such as AEB, speed limiting devices and underride guards should be standard equipment in all CMVs as the safety benefits of requiring this equipment fleet-wide are incontrovertible.


Proper Training for Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers

The lack of uniform adequate training for candidates wishing to obtain their CDL has been a known safety problem for decades.  In 2015, Advocates was appointed by the FMCSA to serve on the Entry-Level Driver Training Advisory Committee (ELDTAC) established to complete a negotiated rulemaking on Entry-Level Driver Training (ELDT) for novice CMV operators.[89]  The consensus reached by the ELDTAC, as well as the NPRM issued by the FMCSA in March 2016, included the requirement that applicants for a CDL receive a minimum number of hours of behind-the-wheel (BTW) instruction (BTW hours requirement) as part of the core curricula approved for applicants seeking either a Class A or B CDL.[90]  As the FMCSA noted in the NPRM “…BTW training for entry-level drivers is uniquely suited to an hours-based approach because it ensures that driver-trainees will obtain the basic safe driving skills necessary to obtain a Class A or Class B CDL and to operate their vehicles safely—skills that can only be obtained after spending a reasonable amount of time actually driving a CMV” (emphasis added).[91]

However, the Final Rule issued by the Agency in December 2016 removed the BTW hours requirement.  Instead, the Rule simply requires that candidates demonstrate to their instructor that they are proficient in performing a series of maneuvers while operating a CMV.[92]  Thus, this so-called performance based standard requires no BTW training at all for drivers who can maneuver a truck trailer combination in an off-road setting included in the CDL skills test, exactly the same bar that CDL candidates have always been required to pass while taking the skills test administered by state licensing agencies.

The performance standard in the Final Rule does not ensure that CDL applicants who can pass the state CDL skills test will spend any time actually operating a CMV on public roads with an experienced instructor encountering safety critical situations.  This type of real-world training and experience for CDL candidates, which several bodies of experts have determined should be required, is needed in order to enhance the ability of CDL applicants to operate a truck-trailer combination vehicle safely and to avoid crashes.  Therefore, Congress should direct the Agency to amend the Final Rule on ELDT to include a BTW hours requirement.


  • Congress should direct the FMCSA to amend the final rule ELDT for all CDL candidates to include a minimum number of BTW training hours to ensure that novice drivers receive adequate training before operating a CMV on public roads.


Sufficient Oversight of Carriers

Section 5223 of the FAST Act required safety scores in the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program for trucks to be removed from public view.  The FAST Act also required the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) to study the CSA Program method for evaluating the safety of motor carriers and commercial vehicle drivers.[93]  The NASEM study concluded that the method was sound and made several recommendations to improve the CSA Program.[94]  Therefore, the public should once again have access to real-time safety data on trucking companies without any further delay.  Without full access to this data, the traveling public does not have the ability to fully evaluate the safety record of a carrier and the incentive for carriers to improve their practices is significantly curtailed.  While additional improvements to the CSA program are currently being considered, such action does not justify the continued withholding of this data from public view.

In 2016, the FMCSA issued a NPRM to revise the carrier safety ratings procedures in light of adoption of the CSA program.  This rulemaking was intended to allow the Agency to better evaluate the safety records of carriers.  Advocates supported the Agency’s determination to enhance the safety fitness determination (SFD) process, which informs the CSA program, by using on-road safety data to evaluate carriers in addition to an Agency investigation.[95]  This update to the SFD program would have significantly enhanced the FMCSA’s ability to identify unsafe carriers because it would have enabled the Agency to use data from the carrier’s on-road operations, yet the Agency withdrew the rulemaking in August of 2017.[96]  Congress should direct the FMCSA to reinstate and complete this critical regulatory action.

In 2009, the FMCSA issued an ANPRM to consider the establishment of a proficiency examination for new motor carriers to ensure such entities, and the persons who are the principal operating officers of the motor carrier, understand the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) before being granted operating authority.  Congress mandated that the Agency undertake such action in Section 210 of the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999.[97]

Advocates supported the Agency’s action as the FMCSA currently has no means of determining the actual quality of a new entrant’s safety compliance management when the FMCSA accepts the new entrant’s registration and awards it operating authority. The Agency only determines the safety quality of a new entrant’s operations and regulatory compliance after the new entrant has begun operations, up to 18 months following registration with the Agency and an award of temporary operating authority.  As such, Congress should require the FMCSA to complete this critical rulemaking, which is nearly 20 years in the making.


  • All the CSA program safety data must be made available to the public and Congress should direct FMCSA to reinstate the Safety Fitness Determination Rulemaking as well as complete the rulemaking requiring a new entrant proficiency examination.


Motorcoach Safety

The Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2012 included in the safety title of MAP-21 directed Agency regulatory actions on overdue lifesaving measures to improve motorcoach safety.[98]  This mode of transportation is affordable, convenient and popularity.  According the American Bus Association Foundation, the motorcoach industry in North America provided 596.4 million passenger trips in 2015.[99]

Safety deficiencies identified in countless recommendations and crash investigations by the NTSB have languished for years, even decades, until specific deadlines for Agency action were enacted in MAP-21.  However, even now, deadlines for the issuance of a number of final rules and other safety actions required by the law are delayed and statutory deadlines ignored.  For example, the statutory deadline for a final standard for motorcoach roof strength and crush resistance was October 1, 2014.[100]  The NHTSA currently estimates a final rule will not be issued until August 2018, nearly four years overdue.  The rulemaking on anti-ejection countermeasures was also due by October 1, 2014, yet it does not even appear on the Agency’s rulemaking agenda.[101]

According to the NHTSA’s November 2015 Motorcoach Fire Safety Report, approximately 160 motorcoach fires are reported every year in the United States.[102]  In 2014, a motorcoach crash and fire involving high school students on a college trip occurred in Orland, California, killing eight motorcoach passengers as well as the driver.[103]  As a result of its investigation, the NTSB made several safety recommendations including calling for more rigorous performance standards for interior flammability and smoke emissions characteristics, installation of a secondary door for use as an additional emergency exit, and equipping motorcoaches with emergency lighting fixtures and interior luminescent and exterior retroreflective material to mark all emergency exits in order to expedite passenger evacuation.[104]  Section 32704 of MAP-21 directed the NHTSA to research the causes of motorcoach fires and issue mitigation standards based on such research.[105]  The Agency completed the report on its research as noted above and found that some actions could improve motorcoach fire safety.[106]  However, the Agency has failed to issue any prevention and mitigation standards despite the glaring need for these safety improvements that will save lives.

Furthermore, federal inspection data shows that far too many CMVs that transport passengers are operating while in dangerous disrepair.  In 2016, the vehicle out of service (OOS) rate for passenger-carrying CMVs was 6.59 percent.  Thus, about 1 in every 15 inspections resulted in a passenger-carrying CMV being placed out of service for a vehicle-related problem.[107]  Nearly a majority of states (22) have recognized the need to address this public safety threat by requiring that passenger-carrying CMVs be subject to annual inspection.[108]  Yet, the FMCSA withdrew a rulemaking in May of 2017 that would have required states to annually inspect passenger-carrying CMVs despite the clear safety concerns presented by poorly maintained motorcoaches.[109]  Congress should require the Agency to reinstate and complete this critical rulemaking.

Unfortunately, legislation that will undoubtedly worsen motorcoach safety, the Buses United for Safety, Regulatory Reform, and Enhanced Growth for the 21st Century (BUSREGS-21) Act, is currently pending before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.[110]  Advocates strongly opposes this misguided measure as it is nothing more than a compilation of the motorcoach industry’s wish list to eviscerate or evade every meaningful commonsense safety regulation enacted by DOT in recent memory.  Some of the ill-advised provisions in this bill would exempt motorcoach drivers from future regulations addressing individuals afflicted with OSA, hide safety data on motorcoach carriers including school bus operators and establish unnecessary obstacles to future Agency rulemakings to improve the safety record of the industry.

All of the safety advances noted above are critical as millions of passengers are transported by motorcoaches each year.  These delays to ensure occupant protections in a crash or a deadly fire would never be tolerated in any other mode of transportation.  It is both a safety and an economic injustice to those who depend on motorcoach travel to ignore these needed basic safety measures.


  • NHTSA must complete the overdue safety rulemakings mandated by Congress in MAP-21 without further delay and sufficiently address fire safety in motorcoaches.


Automated Commercial Motor Vehicles Must be Subject to Robust Federal Regulations

Advocates believes that automated technology has the potential to significantly reduce crashes involving CMVs.  However, the advent of this technology must not be used as an excuse to eviscerate critical safety regulations administered by the FMCSA.  The public safety protections provided by the FMCSRs become no less important or applicable simply because a CMV has been equipped with an automated driving system (ADS).  In fact, additional substantial public safety concerns are presented by automated commercial motor vehicles (ACMVs).  Automated technology is very much in its infancy as evidenced by the series of fatal and serious crashes that occurred earlier this year involving automated passenger motor vehicles.[111]  If those incidents had involved ACMVs, the results could have been catastrophic and the death and injury toll could have been much worse.  The most current pressing safety shortcomings associated with automated vehicle technology, which include the ADS properly detecting and reacting to other road users, driver engagement and cybersecurity, are exponentially amplified with an ACMV.  Therefore, ACMVs must be subject to robust federal regulations that place public safety as its highest priority.

There is widespread agreement among a variety of stakeholders including labor groups, industry, driver organizations and safety advocates that, for the foreseeable future, regardless of their level of automation, CMVs and ACMVs must have an operator with a valid CDL in the vehicle at all times.  Therefore, Advocates supports the FMCSA’s prior conclusion that the FMCSRs require that “a trained commercial driver must be behind the wheel at all times, regardless of any automated driving technologies available on the CMV….”[112]

Human drivers in ACMVs will also need to be alert to monitor not only the standard operations of the truck but also the ADS as well.  Therefore, the development of ADSs for ACMVs in no way warrants the weakening of critical safety regulations administered by the FMCSA such as those that apply to driver HOS, licensing requirements, entry level training and medical qualifications.

Lastly, as automated technology develops, the FMCSA should consider several commonsense measurers to help ensure that ACMVs are deployed safely and responsibly.  The Agency should consider requiring carriers using ACMVs to apply for additional operating authority and that drivers operating an ACMV must have an additional endorsement on their CDL to ensure they have been properly trained to monitor and, if need be, to operate an ACMV.  In addition, the FMCSA will need to consider the additional measures that will be needed to ensure that ACMVs respond to state and local law enforcement authorities and requirements, and can be properly evaluated during roadside inspections.


  • ACMVs must have an operator with a valid CDL in the vehicle at all times. The development of ACMVs in no way warrants the weakening of critical driver safety regulations administered by FMCSA.


  • FMCSA should consider requiring carriers using ACMVs to apply for additional operating authority and that drivers operating an ACMV must have an additional endorsement on their CDL to ensure they have been properly trained.



Truck crashes continue to occur at an alarmingly high rate.  Yet, segments of the trucking industry continue their unending assault on critical federal regulations that protect public safety including rules that protect drivers, provide the public with accurate safety ratings of carriers, finally mandate an objective record of driver on-duty time, and prevent longer and heavier CMVs from further eroding our Nation’s infrastructure.  Meanwhile, rulemakings which would result in proven safety benefits by requiring the installation lifesaving safety systems such as AEB and speed limiters fleet wide, ensure adequate oversight of carriers and upgrade the structure of motorcoaches languish at DOT.  While the advent of ACMVs offers the potential to finally improve the grim safety record of CMVs, that automated future is still years away.  In the meantime, Congress must require DOT to focus on this unfinished safety agenda as the immediate solution to reducing deaths and injuries caused by CMV crashes.


[1]  Traffic Safety Facts Research Note: 2016 Motor Vehicle Crashes: Overview, NHTSA, Oct. 2017, DOT HS 812 456, available at (2016 Overview).

[2]  2016 Overview; and  Traffic Safety Facts 2015, A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 384. (2015 Annual Report).

[3]  2016 Overview.

[4]  2015 Annual Report.

[5]  2015 Annual Report, Table 74, p. 127.

[6]  National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Motorcoach Run-Off-The-Road, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 9, 1999, Report No. HAR-01-01 (Aug. 28, 2001) available at:;  NTSB, Motorcoach Override of Elevated Exit Ramp Interstate 75, Report No.: HAR-08-01 (July 8, 2008), available at:;  NTSB, Motorcoach Run‐Off‐the‐Road and Rollover U.S. Route 163 Mexican Hat, Utah  January 6, 2008, Report No.: HAR-09-01 (Apr. 21, 2009), available at:;  Ian Lovett, In an Instant, a Bus to College Was a Fiery Trap, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 2014, available at: Ciaran McEvoy and Jonah Engel Bromwich, At Least 13 Killed in Bus Crash on California Highway, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2016, available at:

[7] 2017 Pocket Guide to large Truck and Bus Statistics, June 2017, Table 4-22, p. 46, FMCSA.

[8] 2000 Federal Highway User Fee Equity Ratios, Addendum to the 1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study Final Report, FHWA, May 2000.

[9] Report of the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, Transportation for Tomorrow, Dec. 2007.

[10] Pub. L. No. 114-94 (2015) (FAST Act).

[11] FAST Act, § 1410.

[12] FAST Act, § 5202.

[13] FAST Act, § 5221.

[14] FAST Act, § 5223.

[15] 2017 Infrastructure Report Card – Roads, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).

[16] National Transportation Safety Board, 2017-18 Most Wanted list, available at: (NTSB Most Wanted List).

[17] Hours of Service of Drivers, NPRM (2010 NPRM), FMCSA, 75 FR 82170 (Dec. 29, 2010), citing Dinges, D.F. & Maislin, G., “Truck Driver Fatigue Management Survey,” FMCSA (May 2006), FMCSA-2004-19608-3968.

[18] 2010 NPRM, 75 FR 82176 .

[19] Deborah Lockridge, Electronic Logs: The End of the Comic Book?, (Dec. 18, 2009).

[20] Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Analysis & Information Online, 2016 Calendar Year, available at:

[21] Electronic Logging Devices and Hours of Service Supporting Documents, Final Rule (2015 Final Rule), FMCSA, 80 FR 78292 (Dec. 16, 2015).

[22] Id. at 78294.

[23] Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Title II, Subtitle C, § 32301(b), Pub. L. 112-141 (July 6,  2012) codified at 49 United States Code § 31137(a).

[24] Id. at 78292.

[25] Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, et al. v. FMCSA, 840 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2016).

[26] NTSB Most Wanted List; NHTSA, Drowsy Driving, available at: driving; 75 FR 82170.

[27] Watson NF, Morgenthaler T, Chervin R, Carden K, Kirsch D, Kristo D, Malhotra R, Martin J, Ramar K, Rosen I, Weaver T, Wise M. Confronting drowsy driving: The American Academy of Sleep Medicine Perspective. J Clin Sleep Med 2015; 11(11): 1335-1336; citing Dawson A, Reid K. Fatigue, alcohol, and performance impairment. Nature 1997; 388:235. Accessed at

[28] Sieber, W. Karl, Cynthia F. Robinson, Jan Birdsey, Guang X. Chen, Edward M. Hitchcock, Jennifer E. Lincoln, Akinori Nakata, and Marie H. Sweeney. “Obesity and Other Risk Factors: The National Survey of U.S. Long-Haul Truck Driver Health and Injury.” Am. J. Ind. Med. American Journal of Industrial Medicine 57.6 (2014): 615-26. Print; Orris, Peter. Literature Review on Health and Fatigue Issues Associated with Commercial Motor Vehicle Driver Hours of Work. Washington, D.C.: Transportation Research Board, 2005. Print.

[29] Commercial Motor Vehicle Driver Fatigue, Long-Term Health, and Highway Safety: Research Needs, National Academy of Sciences, Mar. 10, 2016.

[30] 65 FR 25539 (Apr. 2000); Saccomano, F., et al., “Effect of Driver Fatigue On Truck Accident Rates,” Urban   Transport and the Environment for the Twenty-First Century (ed. L.J. Sucharov), Computational Mechanics  Publications, Southampton, U.K., 439-446 (1995); Saccomano, F. and Shortread, J., “Truck Safety: Perceptions and Reality,” the Institute for Risk Reduction, Ontario, Canada, 157-174 (1996).; Lin, T. et al., “Time of Day Models of Motor Carrier Accident Risk,” Transportation Research Record 1467: 1-8, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, (1994); Frith, W., “A Case-Control Study of Heavy Vehicle Drivers’ Working Time and Safety,” Proceedings of the Australian Road Research Board Conference, 17(5): 17- 30 (1994).

[31] Jovanis, J.P., Wu, K.F., and Chen, C., “Hours of Service and Driver Fatigue – Driver Characteristics Research,”   FMCSA (April 2011), DOT docket number FMCSA-2004-19608-27614.

[32] Blanco, M., Hanowski, R., Olson, R., Morgan, J., Soccolich, S., Wu, S.C., and Guo, F., “The Impact of Driving,  Non-Driving Work, and Rest Breaks on Driving Performance in Commercial Vehicle Operations,” FMCSA (April 2011), DOT docket number FMCSA-2004-19608-27612.

[33] 68 FR 22456 (Apr. 28, 2003).

[34] 76 FR 81134 (Dec. 27, 2011).

[35] Id.

[36] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015, Division K, Sec. 133, Pub. L. 113-235 (2014). See also:

[37] H.R. 5417, 115th Cong., 2d. Sess. (2018).

[38] 81 FR 12642 (Mar. 10, 2016).

[39] MCSAC-MRB Task 11-05 Report (Feb. 21, 2012).

[40] American Academy of Sleep Medicine (AASM), About the American Academy of Sleep Medicine, available at: (accessed June 3, 2016); 81 FR 12643 citing Gay, P., Weaver, T., Loube, D., Iber, C. (2006).  Evaluation of positive airway pressure treatment for sleep related breathing disorders in adults. Positive Airway Pressure Task Force; Standards of Practice Committee; American Academy of Sleep Medicine. SLEEP 29:381–401.

[41] 81 FR 12643 (Mar. 10, 2016).

[42] Burks SV, Anderson JE, Bombyk M, Haider R, Ganzhorn D, Jiao X, Lewis C, Lexvold A, Liu H, Ning J, Toll A, Hickman JS, Mabry E, Berger M, Malhotra A, Czeisler CA, Kales SN. Nonadherence with employer-mandated sleep apnea treatment and increased risk of serious truck crashes. SLEEP 2016;39(5):967–975. (2016 AASM Study).

[43] Id.

[44] Karimi M, Hedner J, Häbel H, Nerman O, Grote L. Sleep apnea related risk of motor vehicle accidents is reduced by continuous positive airway pressure: Swedish traffic accident registry data. SLEEP 2015;38(3):341–349.

[45] 81 FR 12644 (Mar. 10, 2016).

[46] Id. at 12643.

[47] 2016 AASM Study, pg. 967.

[48] In 2000, FMCSA issued advisory criteria instructing medical examiners who suspect that a driver may have a condition that may interfere with oxygen exchange such as OSA to be referred to a specialist for further evaluation and possible treatment.  However, as noted in the ANPRM “the current guidance is not helpful if the ME does not have sufficient experience or information to suspect that the driver may have OSA, or the driver does not share with the examiner any previous diagnosis that he has the condition.” (81 FR 12645).

[49] 82 FR 37038 (Aug. 8, 2017).

[50] 115th Congress, 1st Sess. (2017).  A companion bill has also been introduced in the Senate by Senators Corey Booker (NJ), Kirsten Gillibrand NY), Charles Schumer (NY) Robert Menendez (NJ) and Richard Blumenthal (CT) (S. 1883, 115th Congress, 1st Sess. (2017)).

[51] H.R. 4, 115th Cong., 2d. Sess. (2018).

[52] Letter to Members of the House of Representatives, Re: Preemption of States Rights in FAA Reauthorization
(Apr. 18, 2018).

[53] H.R. 5358, 115th Cong., 2d. Sess. (2018); H.R. 3889, 115th Cong., 2d. Sess. (2018).

[54] 49 CFR § 391.11.

[55] Id; Data on CMV drivers under the age of 21 is likely restricted to intra-state operations.

[56] Blower, D.; Lyles, R.W.; Campbell, K.L.; and Stamatiadis, P. 1990. The Michigan heavy truck study. Lansing, MI: Michigan Office of Highway Safety Planning.

[57] 68 FR 34467 (Jun. 9, 2003).

[58] Id. at 34469.

[59] FAST Act, § 5404.

[60] Making appropriations for the Department of Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2019, and for other purposes, 115th Congress, 2nd Sess. (2018).  Proposals have also been advanced that would allow heavier trucks to operate as part of a multi-state pilot program.

[61] Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 49 Part 571 Section 121: Standard No. 121 Air brake systems (FMVSS 121).

[62] Roadside Inspections, Vehicle Violations: All Trucks Roadside Inspections, Vehicle Violations (2016 – Calendar), FMCSA, available at

[63] Motor Carrier Safety Progress Report (as of 12/31/17), FMCSA.

[64] Equivalent Single Axle Load, Pavement Interactive, Aug. 15, 2007, available at

[65] 2017 Infrastructure Report Card – Bridges, ASCE, available at

[66] 2017 Infrastructure Report Card – Roads, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).

[67] An Analysis of Truck Size and Weight: Phase I – Safety, Multimodal Transportation & Infrastructure Consortium, November 2013; Memorandum from J. Matthews, Rahall Appalachian Transportation Institute, Sep. 29, 2014.

[68] Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Limits Study: Bridge Structure Comparative Analysis Technical Report, FHWA, June 2015. This figure does not account for the additional, subsequent maintenance costs which will result from longer, heavier trucks.

[69] Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Limits Study: DOT Transmittal letters to Congress, June 5, 2015.

[70] Pub. L. 112–141, Sec. 32703 (2012).

[71] 80 FR 36050 (Jun. 23, 2015).

[72] Petition for Rulemaking: Requesting Issuance of a Rule to Require the Use of Forward Collision Avoidance and Mitigation Systems for Commercial Motor Vehicles, Docket No.: NHTSA-2015-099.

[73] Woodrooffe, J., et. al., Performance Characterization and Safety Effectiveness Estimates of Forward Collision Avoidance and Mitigation Systems for Medium/Heavy Commercial Vehicles, Rep. No.  UMTRI-2011-36, pp.xxii-xxiii (August, 2012) (F-CAM Report).

[74] Traffic Safety Facts 2015, Table 46, Collision with Motor Vehicle in Transport by Initial Point of Impact, DOT HS 812 384, NHTSA (2017).  This may mean that the number of fatalities in large truck crashes that could be prevented or ameliorated by F-CAM technology is far higher than 300 deaths annually.

[75] F-CAM Report p. xxvii, Table E-7, Safety Benefit Estimates: Reduction in Fatalities, Injuries, and No Injuries, Tractor-Semitrailers.

[76] 80 FR 62487 (Oct. 16, 2015).

[77] 81 FR 61942 (Sep. 7, 2016).

[78] Id. at 61944.

[79] Id. at 61945.

[80] Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, FMVSS No. 140, Speed Limiting Devices, p. 28 (NHTSA, Aug. 2016).

[81] Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), Speed limiters in trucks would serve 2 purposes, Status Report, Vol. 45, No. 8 (Aug. 21, 2010).

[82] 115th Congress, 1st Sess. (2017).  A companion bill has also been introduced in the Senate by Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (NY) and Marco Rubio (FL) (S. 2219, 115th Congress, 1st Sess. (2017)).

[83] 80 FR 78420 (Dec. 16, 2015).

[84] Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), Petition for Rulemaking, 49 CFR Part 571 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Impact Guards; Rear Impact Protection, pg. 2 (Feb. 2011)(IIHS Petition).  See also: IIHS, Truck underride guard evaluations, available at:

[85] 80 FR 43663 (Jul. 23, 2015).

[86] IIHS News, IIHS tests show benefits of side underride guards for semitrailers (May 10, 2017).

[87] IIHS News, Rear underride crashes are easier to address than front or side ones (Mar. 14, 2013).

[88] NTSB, Safety Recommendation H-14-002 (Apr. 3, 2014); NTSB, Safety Recommendation H-10-13 (Oct. 21, 2010).

[89] 80 FR 7814 (Feb. 12, 2015).

[90] 81FR 11945 (Mar. 7, 2016).

[91] Id. at 11957.

[92] 81 FR 88751 (Dec. 8, 2016).

[93] FAST Act, § 5221.

[94] National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, Consensus Study Report, Improving Motor Carrier Safety Measurement (2017).

[95] 81 FR 3562 (Jan. 21, 2016).

[96] 82 FR 14848 (Mar. 23, 2017).

[97] Pub. L. 106-159 (1999).

[98] Pub. L. 112-141 (July 6, 2012).

[99] American Bus Association, 2015 Motorcoach Census (Oct. 9, 2017).

[100] MAP-21, § 32703.

[101] Agency Rule List Spring 2018: Department of Transportation, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.

[102] NHTSA, Motorcoach Fire Safety, Final Report, Rep. No.: DOT HS 812 213 (2015) (NHTSA Fire Safety Final Report).

[103] NTSB, Truck-Tractor Double Trailer Median Crossover Collision With Motorcoach and Postcrash Fire on Interstate 5, Orland, California, April 10, 2014.

[104] Id.

[105] MAP-21 Act, Sec. 32704, Pub. L. 112-141 (2012).

[106] NHTSA Fire Safety Final Report.

[107] All Passengers Roadside Inspection Out-of-Service (OOS) Rates (2016-Calendar), FMCSA Analysis & Information Online, available at

[108] 81 FR 24770 (Apr. 27, 2016).

[109] 82 FR 20311 (May 1, 2017).

[110] H.R. 2120, 115th Cong., 2d. Sess. (2018).

[111] Peter Valdes-Dapena, Tesla in Autopilot mode crashes into fire truck, CNN Tech, (Jan. 24, 2018); Everett Rosenfield, Tempe police release video of deadly Uber accident, CNBC (Mar. 21, 2018); David Shephardson, U.S. opens probe into fatal Tesla crash, fire in California, Reuters (Mar. 27, 2018); Karma Allen, Tesla Model S was in Autopilot mode during Utah crash, driver says, ABC News (May 15, 2018).

[112] 83 FR 12935 (Mar. 26, 2018).